Corporations - Preference Rights on Dissolution by Fiske, Jr., Robert B., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 6 
1955 
Corporations - Preference Rights on Dissolution 
Robert B. Fiske, Jr. S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the 
Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert B. Fiske, Jr. S.Ed., Corporations - Preference Rights on Dissolution, 53 MICH. L. REV. 887 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss6/11 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1955] RECENT DECISIONS 887 
CoRPoRAnoNs-PREFERENCB RIGHTS ON D1ssoLunoN-The capital struc-
ture of the defendant corporation consisted of class A, class B, and preferred 
stock. According to the articles of association, the class A stock was entitled to 
a ten percent dividend before any dividend was paid on the class B. After the 
class B stock had also received a ten percent dividend, the two classes were to 
share equally in any further dividends. The charter further provided that on 
dissolution the holders of the class A stock were entitled to cash to the amount 
of the par value of their stock before any payment in liquidation was made to 
the holders of the class B stock. Upon dissolution of the defendant, the class A 
stockholders claimed the right to share equally with the class B stockholders in 
surplus assets remaining after both had received the par value of their stock. 
Held, all assets remaining after the holders of class A stock have received par 
value are to be distributed to the class B shareholders. The preference given 
class A stockholders on dissolution is clearly exhaustive. Mohawk Carpet Mills, 
Inc. 11. Delaware Rayon Company, (Del. Ch. 1954) 110 A. (2d) 305. 
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Historically, stock preferences may be divided into two types: (I) rights with 
respect to dividends, and (2) rights concerning the distribution of assets on 
dissolution.1 The relative rights of the various classes of stockholders with 
regard to these preferences is a matter of contract, governed by the corporate 
charter.2 When these rights are clearly set forth in the charter there is no prob-
lem. The difficulty arises when the articles allocate a given preference to one 
class of stock without stating the rights of all the stockholders after the stipu-
lated preference has been realized. The problem then becomes one of construc-
tion, with a lack of agreement among the courts as to the effect of this omission 
in the charter. When the preferred stock is granted a preference with respect 
to dividends, without more, most courts hold that this provision is exhaustive, 
and that all dividends declared after the preferred stock has received this pref-
erence belong to the common. 3 Many factors have been relied on to sustain 
this position,4 but the basic foundation of the majority view lies in the maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,5 backed up by a "common understanding" 
of the investing public as to the nature of preferred stock. 6 A few courts, 
adhering to the theory that all classes of stock are equal in the absence of pro-
vision to the contrary, allow the preferred stock to share in dividends beyond 
the stated preference,7 once the common has received an amount equal to the 
priority given the preferred.8 The advocates of this view maintain that the 
1 Goldman v. Postal Telegraph Inc., (D.C. Del. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 763. See generally 
39 CA:r.n:. L. R.Bv. 568 (1951). 
2 STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS, 2d ed., 468 (1949). 
8 Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 93 Md. 475, 49 A. 327 (1901); Stone v. United 
States Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, 111 A. 536 (1920); Tennant v. Epstein, 356 ill. 26, 
189 N.E. 864 (1934). See Rowell, ''Rights of Preferred Shareholders in Excess of Pref-
erence,'' 19 MINN. L. R.Bv. 406 (1935). 
4 Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., [1912] 2 Ch. 571, affd. [1914] A.C. 11 
(implied term of the contract); Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1913) 202 F. 
141 (common stockholders bear loss in times of adversity and thus should receive benefit in 
times of prosperity); Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., note 3 supra (skillfully drawn charter 
taken as indication that all rights were stated and nothing left to construction). 
5 Tennant v. Epstein, note 3 supra; Stone v. United States Envelope Co., note 3 supra. 
6 "Surely the phrase 'preferred stock' holds out to the ear of the ordinary investor no 
promises of participation in earnings beyond his preferential dividend." Stone v. United 
States Envelope Co., note 3 supra, at 398. See also Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 166 
Md. 590, 171 A. 842 (1934). 
7 Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 A. 614 (1918); Stembergh v. Brock, 225 
Pa. 279, 74 A. 166 (1909); Star Publishing Co. v. Ball, 192 Ind. 158, 134 N.E. 285 
(1922). 
8 Although Professor Thompson in his article, ':Respective Rights of Preferred and 
Common Stockholders in -Surplus Profits,'' 19 MrCH. L. R.Bv. 463 (1921), lists pari passu 
sharing of all dividends after the preferred has received its preference as a possible theory, 
he is quick to point out that this theory has not been accepted by any court. Indeed, in 
Niles v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., note 4 supra, the court rejected the preferred shareholders' claim 
based on the minority view partially because a logical extension of this position would allow 
the preferred to share equally in all earnings in excess of its preferential dividend. As a 
practical matter, the preferred stockholders usually concede the right of the common stock 
to an amount equal to the preference involved before claiming a pari passu. share. See 
principal case at 306. 
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preferred stock's preference as to time should not create an automatic preference 
as to amount for the common stock.9 Some courts have drawn a distinction 
between cash and stock dividends, recognizing an exception to the majority view 
when a stock dividend is involved and when denial of equal participation among 
the preferred and common stock would affect the voting control, or interest in 
total corporate assets, of the preferred stock.10 
The second branch of stock preferences, rights to surplus assets on dissolu-
tion, has been litigated less frequently. The principal case appears to be the 
first American case to deal with the problem. The early view of the English 
courts was that after the common stock had received an amount equal to the 
liquidation priority given the preferred, both should share equally in the re-
maining assets.11 Dissolution rights were distinguished from those involving 
dividends,12 and the burden placed on the common stockholders to show why 
both classes should not share equally.13 In 1949, however, in Scottish Insur-
ance Corp. v. Wilsons and Clyde Co.,14 and Re Isle of Thanet Electric Supply 
Co.,15 prior authority was overruled and a rule of law adopted similar to the 
majority rule on dividend preferences.16 All assets remaining after the prefer-
ence given to the preferred stock prima facie belong to the holders of the com-
mon, with the burden resting on the preferred stockholders to show that the 
charter provides otherwise. In this fashion, preferred shareholders were reduced 
to a position paralleling that of debenture holders.17 Besides the fact that the 
holding of the court in the principal case is in accord with existing authority, 
further support for the decision may be found in the fact that the defendant's 
charter specifically provided for pari passu sharing of dividends, while remaining 
silent on this matter in the case of dissolution.18 As pointed out above, the rights 
of stockholders in excess of stipulated preference depend on the construction 
given the corporate charter. For this reason, as in other areas of the law in-
volving questions of construction, the desired objective lies not so much in 
9 See Christ, ''Right of Preferred Stock to Participate in the Distribution of Profits," 
27 MICH. L. RBv. 731 (1929). 
10 Ibid.; Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Thomas Branch and Co., 147 
Va. 509, 137 S.E. 620 (1927). But see Niles v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., note 4 supra. 
11 In re William Metcalfe and Sons, Ltd., [1933] 1 Ch. 142; In re Fraser and Chalmers, 
Ltd., [1919] 2 Ch. 114; In re Espuela Land & Cattle Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 187. Contra, In 
re National Telephone Co., [1914] 1 Ch. 755. 
12 See Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., note 4 supra. But see BALLANnNB, 
CoRPoRAnoNs, rev. ed., §217 (1946). 
13 In re William Metcalfe and Sons, Ltd., note 11 supra; In re John Dry Steam Tugs, 
Ltd., [1932] 1 Ch. 594. 
14 [1949] A.C. 462. 
15 [1949] 2 All E.R. 1060. 
16 For a comprehensive analysis of the development of English law on this subject and 
the significance of the Scottish Insurance and Isle of Thanet cases, see "Participating Rights 
of Preference Shares," 209 I.Aw TIMEs 36 (1950); ''Rights of Preference Shares in Wind-
ing Up," 1950 ScOTs I.Aw TIMEs 69. 
17 Scottish Ins. Corp. v. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., note 14 supra. 
18 In this connection see also the articles of association involved in Re Isle of Thanet 
Electric Supply Co., note 15 supra, and In re National Telephone Co., note 11 supra. 
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which particular construction is chosen as in the formulation of a definite rule 
that can be relied on in the future. Careful draftsmen will leave nothing to 
construction by including in the charter an express provision granting or deny· 
ing participation rights. However, for purchasers of stock in corporations having 
articles which are silent as to participation rights on dissolution, the existence of 
a definite rule of construction is invaluable. 
Robert B. Fiske, Jr., S.Ed. 
